The last few weeks’ explorations have strengthened my view that expressivists are more in line with my personal teaching style (as opposed to cognitives or social-epistemics). I recognize the expressivist problem of possible self-isolation, which I will discuss in more detail later, but first I want to share a personally unexpected discovery: that my inclination toward any school of teaching stems mainly out of my concern with the barrier between insiders and outsiders, that is, the barrier of entering the academy; I want to lessen the barrier, make it easier for those who want to become part of the academic world to do so. Expressivism, I’ve found, is the most practical out of the three schools of teaching in opening up to students the doors of the academy.
Cognitivism is the furthest from my inclination. Although I mostly agree with cognitive rhetoric’s fundamental argument that logic leads to the truth, my biggest concern with the rhetoric is its inaccessibility. The cognivist language is taught in schools and in universities where they prepare “the managers who were to take this new body of practical knowledge into the marketplace,” creating an “elite” class that would “assume its rightful place of leadership in church and state” (Berlin 121). Empirical thinking has the risk of excluding those who think in another way, and mark them not only as different, but as “wrong.” I cherish the process of logical deduction and I root for science to push the boundaries of thinking, but I am weary of the belief (or ideology) on which the cognitive rhetoric is based: that truth is “inscribed in the very nature of things as indisputable scientific facts,” and not open to discussion (Berlin 126). Cognitive rhetoric says that logic leads to the only truth, and I believe we’re in trouble when language starts shutting down possibilities. The strictness of cognitivist thinking protects the insiders as members of an elite club, hampering the unconventionality needed at times for progress in the domain.
That said, let us put cognitive rhetoric aside for now. I want to spend most of the space with my struggles between expressivist rhetoric and social-epistemic rhetoric. Though I end up agreeing mostly with the expressivists in their ideology of teaching freshmen, both schools of thinking have their valid points.
For social-epistemics, I agree with much of their attempts to be self critical and to locate the writings in culture and society. However, what turns me away from their school is that these writers, especially if they are inexperienced, are susceptible to becoming overly political, forsaking to the actual goal of the course: to improve academic writing skills. Better environments in which social-epistemic melds well with the curriculum are the social studies, politics, or history courses in which human political and economic conditions are under study.
More importantly, since social-epistemic rhetoric focuses much more on information gathered outside of the writing course, the outside information is likely to distract freshmen writers and possibly hamper their creativity. For social-epistemics, information comes from the outside, and therefore there is always more information to be gathered. This type of learning increases the risk of regurgitation, and worse yet, it easily takes agency away from freshmen writers because the authority is shown to be placed on the outside, rather than within the writers themselves.
The big issue, then, is writer’s authority. Penrose and Geisler have conducted a research with the writing processes of a Ph.D. student, Roger, and a less experienced writer, Janet. The experiment shows the importance of having writer’s authority. It becomes clear that Janet places authority outside of herself, referring to the selection of published articles as “the book,” becoming confused when the articles present different opinions. She treats the ideas she reads as set in stone. She views herself as a receptor, not as a fellow academic. Roger, on the other hand, sees himself inside the academy, and therefore reads and writes with authority, uses the differences of opinion to further his own arguments. Certainly Roger’s knowledge of the domain helps him in writing with authority, however, Janet, even with less knowledge, has come up with her own unique ideas. It is just that these ideas are not in the final paper because she dismisses them as unimportant. I agree with Penrose/Geisler that Janet’s devaluation comes from the lack of writer’s authority. I want to point out that the source of her impulse to abdicate is not because she is less knowledgeable about the domain, but that she is less knowledgeable about writing essays in general.
Students should be taught to develop their authoritative voice as early as possible, since it is a separate task than developing domain knowledge. I agree with Penrose/Geisler that it is vital to help students understand that their voices count. Then they can build upon their knowledge base, and their essays will become increasingly inclusive in their arguments. It is important for the students to understand that their domain knowledge will unlikely be as all-encompassing as the professor’s, but their lesser domain knowledge does not prevent them from creating strong essays out of what they have already learned.
I am not arguing that only expressivists want their students to write with authority. Of course social-epistemics want it also. I merely want to point out that social-epistemics reinforce the practice of acknowledging the authority of others, and this nodding toward others’ authority is an old tune. High school has trained students to be vessels of information instead of analyzers. Since writing composition class is an introduction to college writing, it is a perfect place to show the students that they, too, have the authority they see in published works. Their ideas count just as much. Their ideas are not “wrong” just because they contradict with what they have read. I agree wholeheartedly with the factor of expressivism that makes gaining authority the visible task of writing composition teachers. I find this philosophy more enabling than the lack of focus on writing shown by the social-epistemics. That is, expressivists focus more on the writing itself, while social-epistemics are lured to be distracted by agendas, especially large social agendas with lots of discussions already in print and therefore overwhelming to the student writer. These are rough generalizations, but I believe these tendencies are at the cores of these schools of thought. I share the goal of social-epistemics to help students become “agents of social change rather than victims” (Berlin 134). However, first student need to gain confidence in their ideas, and learn how to argue their point.
Another issue with which these two schools of teaching struggle is writer’s naiveté. Social-epistemics point out that expressivists could be naïve and be out of touch with the actual social economic situation, and become ineffective through isolation. While this is indeed the risk, I emphasize that the goal of a writing composition class is to teach students how to write. I agree with Elbow in that if the writing cannot be created, then the ideas, whether of social-epistemics or other groups of thinkers, cannot be related. He writes,
When I get a strongly felt, fully committed, arrogant paper, I am happy to wrestle and try to get tough with the writer. But so often with first year students it is the latter: timidity and lack of deep entwinement in what they are writing. (80-81)
Becoming less naïve is a different agenda than learning to write academically. In fact, if naïve ideas are well presented in the language of the academy, then that ideas can then be debated. But the ideas have to be presented first, and presented in a form understood by the academy.
A great example is the student essay “Queers, Bums, and Magic,” in which the student might be displaying homophobic and classist ideas. But the problem with analyzing that paper is that readers cannot be sure whether the paper is a satire. The student is ignorant of the audience and the discourse in which he is asked to participate. This is a failure of academic writing, not the failure of an idea. If the author were truly homophobic and classist, but knew how to speak the academic tongue, then the paper would more readily become a conversation piece in the classroom. It is the uncertainty of the author’s academic craft that hampers the arguments against its apparent reasoning.
The naiveté and ineffectiveness that social-epistemics accuse of expressivists is the precise sin against which the expressivists are fighting. To lessen naiveté, students need to first learn to present their naïve ideas in the academic tongue. Then the next step is for them to engage in conversations that mould and mature those initially naïve ideas. As seen in “Queers, Bums and Magic,” some ideas can be potentially vulgar. However, it is the academy’s job to encourage students to be unafraid to voice their opinions, because opinion itself is not the thing that prevents the student from entering the academy. This encouragement leads to the ultimate purpose: to discuss ideas, not just as a mode of self-expression but also as an attempt to create a better society. If the author of “Queer, Bum, and Magic” presented his ideas in the academic language, then others are able to counter those ideas, instead of being just confused and disturbed. Discussion brings ideas to the surface, and gives society a chance to reason against prejudices.
Now, even though I find expressivism to be more enabling to a freshman writer, I am also wary of its dangers of isolation, which can hinder the student from entering the academy. Elbow’s teaching strategy includes a different system of evaluation that he finds more enabling to the students. Elbow argues that the current A-to-F grading system hinders the learning of the students. But he is not arguing against judgment so much as arguing against “that crude, oversimple way of representing judgment—distorting it, really—into a single number” (Elbow 391). He suggests other ways of judgment. He points to the H-and-U method, which attempts to take away the linear judgment that Elbow seems to feel cannot do a paper justice, and provides a hazy evaluation that might has well have “see me” after the mark if the student is to get more concrete feedback (which some students crave). This type of evaluation gives Elbow the room to explain his opinion to the student, rather than distilling the opinion into a number to decipher. He also suggests the grid method, which does the opposite of the H-and-U method, and provides the student with a roundhouse of feedback, still not distilling his opinion into a single number. This method also gives him room to express his opinion more fully.
It seems, then, Elbow’s discomfort with the grading system is that it fails at communicating with the student in a way that would help the student to improve. The number does not tell students how to improve.
I agree with Elbow that the point of any sort of grading system is to help the student on the journey to self-improvement. However, I want to highlight a complication that Elbow brings up but then sidesteps: “grading is unfair and counterproductive but that students and institutions tend to want grades” (393). Even if one teaching community changes the value of grades for its students, those same students would need to go on to the larger academic community where the rules and implications of grades firmly exist.
So, in a larger sense, Elbow’s attempts against ranking as shown above is helpful only if the students can then be integrated into the academic environment, or become a source powerful enough to be recognized by the academy as an ally. The danger of Elbow’s utopic approach (which is self-recognized) is that it could isolate the individuals and hinder them from entering the already existing academy. That is, the risk of not playing by the rules of the game is not being able to play the game at all.
I realize that I am speaking in a vague philosophical sense. An example of what I mean is the possible ramifications of Elbow’s comment that “a good number of [the students used to getting As] discover that they can’t get them [in his class], and they soon settle down to accepting a B” (397). Elbow says that this settling gives them “less anxiety and more of a learning voyage,” but fails to mention that this settling could shut them out of higher institutions that still use grades as a measuring method. Also, Elbow ignores in this essay the complicated issue of student motivation. If students realize that they can’t get As, some, like me when I was an undergraduate, would not sign up for Elbow’s course at all, or if they were stuck in the course, would be less motivated because they would feel that their hard work would not be justly rewarded. I felt exactly this way when I had to take an obligatory English course in which it was rumored that no one ever gets an A. Motivation is important for students to do well. If students are not doing the best of their abilities, the danger then is not only that they might not enter the academy, but that they are cheating themselves.
A difficulty of creating a small utopia is dealing with the ways in which it rubs up against the reality of the outside world. I agree with most of Elbow’s thinking in fostering learning, but I am more cynical, and am perhaps more concerned with the difficulties his students will have in integrating into the part of the academy not presided over by Elbow.
I have talked in length now about my struggles with two schools of teaching, circling around the problem of lessening the boundary that prevents outsiders from becoming insiders of the academy. My main concern is not which school I prefer (which is useless to the study of teaching composition), but which ideas presented by all of the schools are the more helpful in integrating students into the academic discourse. I have found expressivists’ ideology to share my main concern the most, though I look toward the social-epistemics for the ultimate goal of teaching. That is, I agree with the goal of the social-epistemics of empowering the students politically and giving them agency to voice their opinions, but I find this sort of social political empowerment a distraction from writing-authority empowerment. I agree with Elbow that the main problem of freshmen writers is finding their ideas and becoming passionate about them. Naïveté of society can then be addressed. I look to these teaching philosophies with the specific lens of teaching writing composition, and I believe that first we need to give students the power to write, and then work toward the power of social change.
Works Cited
Berlin, James. “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class.” Teaching Composition. Ed. T.R. Johnson. 3rd. ed. Boston/New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2008. 117-137. Print.
Elbow, Peter. “Ranking, Evaluating, and Liking: Sorting Out Three Forms of Judgment.” Teaching Composition. Ed. T.R. Johnson. 3rd. ed. Boston/New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2008. 387-405. Print.
Penrose, Ann M., and Cheryl Geisler. “Reading and Writing without Authority.” College Composition and Communication 45.4 (1994): 505-520. Web.